In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The "Thinking of Thinking" in MetaphysicsA.9 JOSEPH G. DE FILIPPO a+~6v &Qa voE[, e~eQ ~o~t ~6 XQ&~O~OV, xetl. I~o~tv ~1VdOloLgvo1]o~t0g v6"qotg. (A.9, 1o74b33-34) Therefore it thinks itself, if indeed it is most powerful, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. Thus culminates Aristotle's treatment of God's activity in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The conclusion seems transparent. God is an intellect (vo~Sg); since he is also the (...) best thing, and it is absurd that he should think anything worse than himself, he therefore thinks himself. And since he is nothing other than a thinking (v6"qotg), what he thinks of is thinking (vo~loEe0g). "Thinking of thinking," however, is a notion that is as ambiguous in ancient Greek as it is in English. It is just not clear what sort of thing such a reflexively self-thinking mind would be, though it might seem natural to construe the activity of Aristotle's God as somehow an act of pure self-awareness, self-consciousness or self-knowledge. On such an understanding God would be a separately existing consciousness, with himself or his activity as the only object of that consciousness. In 196 9 R. Norman published a paper which disputed this sort of interpretation.' He argued that when one considers Aristotle's theory of, R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969): 63-74 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji [London, 1979], 93-1o2). While I a-m indebted to Norman's basic approach, my treatment of God's self-thought differs substantially from his in two respects. First, although it isessential to recognize that in Aristotle human thought too thinks itself, this does not justify the conclusion that God's thinking is "of the same kind as our own normal abstract thought" (73). As 1shall argue below in section 4, the characterization of the Prime Mover as v6"qoLgvo~o~t0g is meant specifically to differentiate its activity from the selfthinking of human volSg;human thought could never be characterized as v6"qotgvofioEt0g.Secondly, Norman does not isolate the real source of A.9's argument, which, as l shall argue, is the potential conflict between Aristotle's own physical and psychological theories. M. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, 1988), 229-45, also argues against Norman's thesis that human and divine thought are the same in kind. [543] 544 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 volSg from De Anima III.4-8, it is clear that the conception of God as a selfthinking mind does not entail that he engages in self-contemplation in the normal sense of the term. On Norman's interpretation, God thinks himself because he thinks a definite content with which he is numerically identical, according to the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of vo~g with its object of thought (vo~lx6v). To describe this act simply as self-contemplation belies the fact that its object must have an intelligible content, which in the case of God is not adequately described as his "self," for this self would indeed be nothing more than an act of self-contemplation. While many commentators have followed Norman in recognizing that the description of God as "thinking himself" is drawn from the De Anima's characterization of self-thinking, there has persisted a tendency to interpret Aristotle 's God as engaged in an act of pure self-awareness or under some similar description.' The reason for this persistence is due, I believe, to a crucial difference between chapters 7 and 9 of book A. Whereas both chapters characterize the Prime Mover (PM) as a self-thinker, in chapter 9 he is also said to be ~1 v61]otg vo~loec0g V6tlOtg (the thinking of thinking), which understandably appears to be a much more specific delineation of his thought content. A. 7 tells us that the PM is a vofJg that thinks itself (to72b18-3o); according to De Anima III. 4 that simply is what voa)g does at the highest level of actuality, since it... (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma comparação conceitual entre a obra De anima, de Aristóteles, e a concepção das faculdades da alma no Kitáb al-Nafs – edição árabe – (Livro da Alma, De anima), de Ibn Sina (Avicena), com o intuito de mostrar similitudes e in#uências de Aristóteles sobre o pensamento de Ibn Sina, nessa temática. Destaca, ainda, como e a época em que o estagirita foi recebido em terras do Islã, indicando o seu primeiro receptor, o &lósofo Al-Kindi, assim (...) como, de modo pormenorizado, uma comparação sobre a de&nição de alma dada pelos dois &lósofos, e as três espécies de alma, com ênfase para o conceito de alma racional. Apresenta, também, a estrutura de cada uma das obras. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

Nos três problemas preambulares e nas primeiras lições do Commentarium in De anima atribuído a Pedro Hispano, o autor: 1) discute a possibilidade de urna ciência da alma; 2) compara a ciência da alma com as outras ciências naturais; 3) identifica o método da ciência da alma. Daí emerge uma fundamentação da "ciência da alma" como "ciência do homem" e um modelo de organização das ciências, tendencialmente coincidente com a organização do corpus aristotélico, mas com a reivindicação da superioridade (...) da Ciência da alma por razões gnosiológicas. (shrink)

Research papers presented at the same title scientific conference, dedicated to the World Philosophy Day.

This work is a series of studies by various authors, the result of a symposium of the Union Catholique des Scientifiques Français held in October 1956, to discuss man’s peculiar biological place in creation. They comprise chapters on the human brain, neurology, biochemistry and endocrinology. These are intended for specialists in biology and philosophy rather than for the general reader. There are however chapters devoted to the discussion of conclusions drawn from previous studies, and these are both useful and helpful (...) generally. (shrink)

Allen prefaces his book with a quote from Milton's Apology. In it, Milton confesses to a certain education and training in the art of rhetoric, but contrasts it to the genuine eloquence that truth inspires in those speakers who earnestly desire to teach the good things they know to others. It would seem no accident that Allen has chosen the passage; his intention is to tell us the good things he has found in his inquiry into Socrates' trial and condemnation. (...) Accordingly, the book concentrates on Plato's Apology and Crito. (shrink)

At the end of the Middle Ages, the friar Dominican Peter Schwarz wrote The shield of the Thomists. It is a handly book of philosophy in which he presents the main thesis of thomist school, between them is the theory of active intellect.

RÉSUMÉ: Les philosophes de la période moderne sont souvent présentés comme ayant commis une erreur élémentaire: celle de confondre la force propositionnelle avec le contenu propositionnel. Par l'examen de deux cas saillants, à savoir les philosophes de Port-Royal et John Locke, je montre que l'accusation n'est pas fondée, et que Locke en particulier a les ressources requises pour construire une théorie des attitudes propositionnelles.

Morality and politics, by B. Blanshard.--Love and justice, by R. O. Johann.--Responsibility and freedom, by K. Baier.--The mental health ethic, by T. S. Szasz.--Respect for persons, by E. E. Harris.--Ethics and revolution, by H. Marcuse.--Morality and ideology, by H. D. Aiken.--Utility and moral reasoning, by A. I. Melden.--Ethical fallibility, by C. L. Stevenson.

El desaf o de la bio tica es el segundo de una serie de vol menes que lleva al p blico lector la reflexi n y discusi n de diversos temas de este campo de estudio desde una perspectiva laica, racional, multidisciplinaria y plural. Despu s del xito del primer volumen, la construcci n de la bio tica, en este texto se tratan cuestiones que se debaten en todo el planeta. Las humanidades y el mundo actual frente a la t (...) cnica moderna; el papel de la tica en la investigaci n cient fica; el concepto de persona; el aborto tard o y la terminaci n de la vida en neonatos; la objeci n de conciencia en la medicina; los conflictos entre derechos privados y bienes p blicos; la relaci n entre la pr ctica m dica y la industria farmac utica; la inmigraci n y el mestizaje, y los derechos humanos. Los autores de estos temas son m dicos, psic logos, cient ficos, soci logos, abogados y fil sofos. (shrink)

Resumo: Percepção sensorial: até hoje um grande mistério filosófico. O presente trabalho divide-se em duas partes. A primeira sintetiza a crítica ao modelo representacionista intracerebral predominante, e enuncia um argumento que prepara o terreno para a segunda parte do trabalho. Nesta, a teoria pragmatista da percepção é equiparada à de Aristóteles, em De Anima. Eis, grosso modo, o argumento: percepção resulta de fatores causais da natureza inerentes à transação organismo ambiente; tais fatores não podem ser encontrados entre os elementos (...) ontológicos revelados na própria percepção; logo a estrutura ontológica revelada na percepção não reflete a total complexidade da transação real organismo ambiente. Esta conclusão é crucial para entender a teoria pragmatista-aristotélica da percepção; passagem da fase sujeito-no-mundo para a fase mundo-no-sujeito, via recepção imaterial de formas - estabelecimento de campo anteceptivo consciente de potencialidades de ação subentendidas em tais formas. Pragmatismo como naturalismo esclarecido: a percepção é a versão histórico-natural mais evoluída do mesmo mecanismo chave-e-fechadura próprio da detecção de formas inerente a interações ontológicas elementares - biológicas e mesmo físico-químicas. Mas em vez de detecção-na-ação nomológica/biológico automática: detecção consciente, em aberto, de possibilidades de ação livre inscritas no ambiente do precipiente.: Even today, sensorial perception is a great philosophic mystery. This work is divided in two parts: The first synthesizes and criticizes the prevailing cerebral representationism model and enunciates an argument that prepares the field to second one. In this second part the pragmatism perceptions theory is compared to Aristotle's De Anima. Here is, in a general way, the argument: perception is the result of nature's cause factors intrinsic to organism environment transaction; these factors cannot be encountered among revealed ontological elements of this same perception; therefore the ontological structure reveled by perception doesn't reflect the totality of the organism-environment's transaction complexity. This conclusion is vital to understand the Aristotelian-pragmatic perception theory: the subject-on-world's transposition to world-on-subject phase, via "immaterial reception of forms"- establishment of the anteceptive field conscious of the action potentialities in such way. Pragmatism naturalism cleared up: the perception is a natural-historic evolved version of this same key-and-locker mechanism proper to form detection intrinsic of elementary ontological, biologic and even physical-chemical interaction. But instead of detection in the automatic nomological/biological action: conscious detection, opened, of free actions possibilities inserted in the percipient environment. (shrink)

This volume explores how Catholicism began and continues to open its doors to the wider world and to other confessions in embracing ecumenism, thanks to the vision and legacy of the Second Vatican Council. It explores such themes as the twentieth century context preceding the council; parallels between Vatican II and previous councils; its distinctively pastoral character; the legacy of the council in relation to issues such as church-world dynamics, as well as to ethics, social justice, economic activity. Several chapters (...) discuss the role of women in the church before, during, and since the council. Others discern inculturation in relation to Vatican II. The book also contains a wide and original range of ecumenical considerations of the council, including by and in relation to Free Church, Reformed, Orthodox, and Anglican perspectives. Finally, it considers the Council’s ongoing promise and remaining challenges with regard to ecumenical issues, including a groundbreaking essay on the future of ecumenical dialogue by Cardinal Walter Kasper. (shrink)

Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of Philosophy and (...) Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158. (shrink)

What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject (...) that o is an instance of ‘x is F’ as she understands this, and hence evident that o is F. Seeing that o is F is thus a way of its being evident that o is F and is therefore a way of knowing that o is F. (shrink)

Mit dem erstmals in einer zweisprachigen, umfangreich kommentierten Edition vorliegenden Liber de platano (1537) erschließt sich ein außergewöhnliches Zeugnis des portugiesischen Humanismus. Das aus einer Abhandlung sowie einem Briefwechsel zwischen dem Dichter João Rodrigues de Sá de Meneses und dem Rhetorikprofessor Juan Fernández bestehende Werk greift mit dem Platanenbaum ein Motiv auf, das durch Platons Phaidros und Ciceros De oratore popularisiert wurde: In beiden Texten finden philosophische Gespräche unter einer Platane statt. Allerdings wird der Baum im Liber de platano zu (...) einem mehrdeutigen Sinnbild. Zwar geht es durchaus um die botanische Frage nach dem Vorkommen der Platane im zeitgenössischen Portugal, doch erweist sich der Buam darüber hinaus auch als Inbild antiker Gesprächskultur und eines an der Antike orientierten genussvollen Lebensstils. In der einleitenden Studie stellt Roger Friedlein neben einer Einführung in den Text die Autoren sowie weitere Humanisten - Miguel da Silva, Jorge Coelho und Luís Teixeira - vor, die einerseits durch ihre Präsenz im Liber de platano von Bedeutung sind. Doch vor dem Hitergund ihrer Aufenthalte in Italien und ihrer Kontakte zu herausragenden Vertretern der italienischen Renaissance wie Pietro Bembo erscheint der Liber de platano zudem als zentrales Zeugnis für den portugiesisch-italienischen Kulturkontakt. (shrink)

We present the idea of searching for X-rays as a signature of the mechanism inducing the spontaneous collapse of the wave function. Such a signal is predicted by the continuous spontaneous localization theories, which are solving the “measurement problem” by modifying the Schrödinger equation. We will show some encouraging preliminary results and discuss future plans and strategy.

Buscando identificar os aspectos informativas de prontuários de pacientes internados por motivações sociais no Hospital Psiquiátrico de Jurujuba em 1953 e de concepções foucaultianas sobre a construção da ‘loucura’ e do ‘louco’ na sua forte relação com modelo de sociedade, esta pesquisa indagou: se a loucura é uma construção social, que na modernidade implicou em segregação, qual a função do documento médico nesse processo? Espera-se que apresentem um conteúdo informativo sobre as doenças (viés informativo). Mas os prontuários daquela instituição não (...) apresentaram-se informativos sobre a loucura. O conflito entre um esperado viés informativo do documento e os nossos resultados levou a proposta de que faz-se necessário um exame mais holístico do valor político e social do documento médico. Propõe-se um exame mais ampliado do documento, enquanto materialidade recortada de determinado acontecimento, com função de modelação e controle, dentro de um dispositivo maior de verdade: o conhecimento e as instituições médico-científicas. O acesso à informação sobre os pacientes, se consequência de um processo de organização eficaz de conjuntos documentais em arquivos médicos, inicia-se pela escrita sobre o paciente que age como sentença (interne-se ou dê-se alta), mas há um silêncio sobre as práticas médicas de tratamento, pelo menos no período e na instituição investigada, que torna o sujeito internado objeto de práticas indescritíveis. Ao final da pesquisa conclui-se que aqueles documentos sobre o louco têm, pelo menos, três vieses passíveis de análise: o da autoria da escrita; o do objeto da escrita, e o viés institucional, ou sobre como o documento institui em alguns casos, na nossa sociedade, relações de poder. Um quarto viés que atravessa todos os outros, o do regime burocrático no qual estamos inseridos e que, por algum motivo, precisa passar pelo caminho do documento para cristalizar o seu poder. (shrink)

t. 1. Texto inédito de los doce primeros capítulos. Facsímil de la segunda versión suareciana (Lyon 1621).

© 2016 Regents of the University of California.The Review summarizes much of particle physics and cosmology. Using data from previous editions, plus 3,062 new measurements from 721 papers, we list, evaluate, and average measured properties of gauge bosons and the recently discovered Higgs boson, leptons, quarks, mesons, and baryons. We summarize searches for hypothetical particles such as supersymmetric particles, heavy bosons, axions, dark photons, etc. All the particle properties and search limits are listed in Summary Tables. We also give numerous (...) tables, figures, formulae, and reviews of topics such as Higgs Boson Physics, Supersymmetry, Grand Unified Theories, Neutrino Mixing, Dark Energy, Dark Matter, Cosmology, Particle Detectors, Colliders, Probability and Statistics. Among the 117 reviews are many that are new or heavily revised, including those on Pentaquarks and Inflation. The complete Review is published online in a journal and on the website of the Particle Data Group. The printed PDG Book contains the Summary Tables and all review articles but no longer includes the detailed tables from the Particle Listings. A Booklet with the Summary Tables and abbreviated versions of some of the review articles is also available. (shrink)

Bohr's 1930 derivation of the uncertainty relation c 2 δm δt≥h bears a close relationship to Einstein's 1913 derivation of the “gravitational redshift” via the “equivalence principle.” A rewording of Bohr's argument is presented here, not taking the last step of acceleration as “equivalent” to a uniform gravity field, thus yielding a derivation of the formula c 2 δm δt≥h, avoiding Treder's 1971 objection.

In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The (...) passage’s argument for the indestructibility of intellect via an analogy to perception does not fit with Aristotle’s own views. Aristotle thinks that perception operates via bodily organs, but denies this of understanding. He also requires separability from the body for indestructibility, something this analogy rules out. However, Aristotle’s Platonist interlocutors may well endorse such an argument. My dialectical interpretation best resolves the interpretative difficulties and explains its place in the larger context, Aristotle’s discussion of Platonist views on the soul. Aristotle presents a challenge to his insistence that the soul is subject to change, dialectically resolves that challenge, and then ends by reserving the right to give a different account of the intellect. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band stellt ein erstes Grundlagenwerk zur Imaginationsforschung in der Ökonomie dar. Er erforscht die ökonomische Theoriegeschichte (auch mit Bezug auf die Philosophiegeschichte) und fragt, welche Bilder und Selbstbilder über Menschen, über das wirtschaftliche System und über die Zukunft in ökonomischen Theorien enthalten sind. Wie ist die Beschäftigung mit Imaginationen im Mainstream der Wirtschaftswissenschaften verloren gegangen und wie kann sie wiederbelebt werden? Prof. Dr. Walter Otto Ötsch ist Professor für Ökonomie und Kulturgeschichte an der Cusanus Hochschule für Gesellschaftsgestaltung. Prof. (...) Dr. Silja Graupe ist Professorin für Ökonomie und Philosophie und Leiterin des Instituts für Ökonomie der Cusanus Hochschule für Gesellschaftsgestaltung. (shrink)

Review of the Modern Mongolian philosophical history.